Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization by Matthias Wrede
 
Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 





























This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 







Göttingen  MAGKS Agglomeration, tax competition,
and scal equalization
Matthias Wrede
University of Marburg and CESifo
This version: May 2008
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of scal equalization on asymmetric tax competition
when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It shows that equalization
of standardized tax revenue improves the spatial allocation of capital provided that
agglomeration externalities are suciently strong.
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Whether or not the outcome of capital tax competition is ecient, has mainly been consid-
ered as a matter of instruments. If only source based taxes are available, taxes are too low
and the equilibrium is inecient (see, e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)), if, in contrast,
also residence based taxes are at hand, eciency can be restored (see Bucovetsky and Wil-
son (1991)). However, the analysis was restricted to a linearly homogeneous production
function which requires capital intensity to be equalized across regions. Furthermore, the
focus was mainly on symmetric equilibria of identical regions. Even if the assumption of
perfect symmetry was relaxed, identical per-capita endowments typically remained (see Bu-
covetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991)). The recent spatial economics literature deviates from
these assumptions: When technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, core-periphery
pattern are likely to emerge. Tax competition has also been studied within the framework
of the New Economic Geography (NEG) and many results of the standard competition lit-
erature (see the survey by Wilson (1999)) have been reversed: Core regions may very well
tax agglomeration rents without aecting the location of capital. Furthermore, instead of
inducing a monotonic race to the bottom, trade integration rst increases tax rates and
later reduces them (see, e.g., Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
and Borck and P uger (2006)). Although these results are remarkable, the tax competition
literature within the NEG framework has two main shortcomings: First, it relies on the
very special assumptions of this strand of literature and there is good reason to doubt the
universal validity of the results. Second, there is no smooth transition to the standard tax
competition model. Neither is the standard model embedded in the NEG model nor is it
the other way round. Especially, for empirical purposes this is truly unsatisfactory. How-
ever, there exists a type of model which exhibits the standard features of the NEG model,
while at the same time has the standard model as a special case. Assuming that real exter-
nalities like knowledge spillovers are the main agglomeration forces, a model with perfect
competition and increasing aggregate returns to scale can be built which comprises both
strands of literature (see Michel et al. (1996)). Burbidge and Cu (2005) have analyzed
tax competition with source and residence based taxes within this framework. They have
shown that asymmetric equilibria with increasing returns to scale are inecient even if
1source and residence based taxes are available. Furthermore, larger regions may be better
o in equilibrium.1
This paper reconsiders the ineciency result of Burbidge and Cu (2005) and shows
that asymmetry and not increasing returns is the main source of ineciency. Further-
more, it analyzes whether scal equalization schemes provide correcting devices. Since
scal equalization is common in federations { either explicitly or implicitly via vertical
grants (see, e.g., Boadway and Watts (2004)) { this analysis is of high policy relevance.
Within the standard model of source based capital tax competition it has been shown by
K othenb urger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) that scal equalization schemes
{ correctly designed { increase eciency if regions are only suciently symmetric. This
paper shows that agglomeration externalities may very well amplify the positive impact of
a (partial) scal equalization scheme.
The following section describes the model and derives the results. Afterwards, a nal
section concludes.
2 Model
The country consists of two regions. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed
that total output generates localized positive externalities.2 Output is produced with two
inputs, capital and labor. Capital is interregional mobile, labor is immobile. The output
price is normalized to one.
The production function xij = X
iG(Kij;Nij), with 0   < 1, characterizes production
of rm j in region i. Here, xij denotes output, Kij and Nij, indicate capital and labor,
respectively. Aggregate output in region i, Xi, raises output, but is considered as exogenous
by each rm.  is a measure of agglomeration externalities. The \internal" production
function G(K;N) is linearly homogeneous, with GKK < 0 < GK and GNN < 0 < GN.3
Both inputs are essential: G(0;N) = G(K;0) = 0. Due to constant returns to scale at the
1A somewhat similar model is used by Boadway et al. (2004).
2This is standard in trade theory, see, e.g., Choi and Yu (2002). In regional economics, the mobile
input is usually considered as source of agglomeration externalities (see, e.g., Fujita and Thisse (2002)).
3Partial derivatives are indicated by subscripts.
2rm level, inputs are paid according to their marginal product, prots are zero, and the
number of rms is irrelevant. Hence, regional output can be written as Xi = X
iG(Ki;Ni),
where Ki and Ni denote capital and labor at the regional level. Solving for Xi, yields
Xi = F(Ki;Ni) := G(Ki;Ni)
1=(1 ) (1)
and hence
ri = (1   )FK(Ki;Ni) and wi = (1   )FN(Ki;Ni); (2)
where ri and wi is the interest rate and the wage in region i, respectively. Aggregate
output is homogenous of degree 1=(1   ). Were  = 0, returns to scale would be constant,
otherwise, they are increasing. It is assumed that agglomeration externalities are not too
strong: FKK(K;N) < 0.
Ni persons live in region i and supply inelastically one unit of labor each. Per-capita
capital endowment in region i is Ki. Total capital and labor is denoted by K := K1+K2 =
K1 + K2 and N := N1 + N2, respectively.
Spatially ecient production Total output is maximized if the marginal product of
mobile capital is equalized across regions:
FK(K1;N1) = FK(K2;N2): (3)
Hence, spatial eciency requires a uniform return to capital (since the return to capital is
proportional to the marginal product of capital). In regions of equal size, i.e., N1 = N2,
capital should be allocated symmetrically. Using (3), it becomes clear that, starting at a
symmetric allocation of labor and capital, shifting workers from region j to region i should












> 0; i = 1;2: (4)
If there were no agglomeration externalities, the capital intensity should stay constant;
in the presence of agglomeration externalities the capital intensity in the larger (and,
therefore, more productive) region should increase.
3Inecient tax competition Regional governments levy capital taxes according to the
source principle and redistribute tax revenue lump-sum. Capital taxes may be negative,
and (residence based) lump-sum taxes are available. The source based capital tax rate in
region i is denoted by ti. An interior equilibrium of the capital market equalizes the return
to capital net of taxes across regions:
r1   t1 = r2   t2; i.e., (1   )FK(K1;N1)   t1 = (1   )FK(K2;N2)   t2: (5)
Using this equilibrium condition and K1 + K2 = K, capital in region i can be written as















; i;j = 1;2; j 6= i:
(6)
An increase in the agglomeration externality strengthens the impact of tax rates on the
spatial allocation of capital. Since public goods are neglected, governments maximize
regional income, namely the sum of labor income, capital income, and tax revenue. At the
market equilibrium, regional income is
Yi = wiNi + (ri   ti)Ki + tiKi = F(Ki;Ni)   (ri   ti)(Ki   Ki); i = 1;2: (7)
The rst-order conditions4 read
@Yi
@ti
= Ki   Ki +








= 0; i = 1;2: (8)
Hence, tax rates at the Nash equilibrium when regional governments determine tax rates
simultaneously are:
ti =  FK(Ki;Ni)   (Ki   Ki)
drj
dKj
; i = 1;2;j 6= i: (9)
If there are neither capital ows nor agglomeration externalities, tax rates are zero. While
capital importing regions tax capital and, thus, reduce the return to capital, capital ex-
porting regions subsidize capital in order to increase the return to capital (due to the
pecuniary externality identied by DePater and Myers (1994)). Agglomeration externali-
ties oer incentives for regional governments to subsidize capital, since the subsidy is an
internalization device.
4It is assumed that these conditions are also sucient.
4From the equilibrium tax rates follows:
ri   ti = FK(Ki;Ni) + (Ki   Ki)
drj
dKj
; i = 1;2;j 6= i: (10)
As a consequence, in the presence of tax competition, capital ows across the border imply
diverging net returns to capital and, therefore, spatial ineciency. Using the eciency
condition (3), yields @Ki=@Ni > 0 for a given total population and a given total capital
endowment, which leads immediately to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium of tax competition is spatially ecient if and only
if under autarky marginal products of capital are equalized across regions. Migration from
one region to the other must be accompanied by a unique parallel movement of capital
endowment.
If regions are identical ex ante in terms of labor and capital endowment, the tax competition
equilibrium is ecient. Otherwise, the equilibrium is generically inecient, since for every
allocation of the total population, only one single allocation of capital endowment allows
for spatial eciency. Without agglomeration externalities per-capita capital endowment
should be equalized across regions; with agglomeration externalities, the larger region has
to have a larger per-capita endowment of capital.
Tax competition, asymmetry, and scal equalization In the following, it will be
analyzed whether a scal equalization scheme which partially equates tax bases and stan-
dardized tax revenue lessens or aggravates spatial ineciency. The transfer to region i is
calculated as








Ni; i = 1;2: (11)
Here,  t = (t1K1 + t2K2)=K is the average tax rate, , with 0   < 1, is the degree
of equalization with respect to standardized tax revenue and , with   0, denotes
the degree of equalization with respect to the tax base. Hence, regional income is Yi =
F(Ki;Ni)   (ri   ti)(Ki   Ki) + Zi. Nash equilibrium rst-order conditions become
@Yi
@ti










FK(Ki;Ni) + ti  
dri
dKi













= 0; i = 1;2;j 6= i:
5Hence, in a symmetrical equilibrium of identical regions tax rates are




Equalization of standardized tax revenue increases the equilibrium tax rates if  > 
FK(K=2;N=2). An increase in a region's tax rate leads to capital outow. This implies a
higher transfer provided that tax rates are positive and/or tax base equalization is strong.
Using the rst-order conditions (12) and the capital market condition (5), yields





























This equation reveals the relationship between the distortion of tax competition and the
scal equalization scheme. Without scal equalization, i.e. if  = 0, the capital-importing
region levys a too high capital tax (subsidizes too little), and, therefore, attracts too little
capital. As a consequence, the marginal product of capital is too high in this region. Due to
the scal equalization scheme, an increase in the average tax rate  t pays o for a particular
region if the capital intensity is rather low. Hence, if the region with the lower capital














and using (14), starting at a symmetrical equilibrium of identical regions the impact of
(exogenously determined) migration from region 2 to region 1 on the allocation of capital
























Hence, the impact of combined migration of workers and capital endowment on the allo-
cation of capital can be calculated: dK1=dN1 = @K1=@N1 + (@K1=@K) (K=N). Since the
6symmetric equilibrium is ecient, the deviation of equilibrium capital ows from the e-
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)FK(K=2;N=2)














[2      (1   )]FKK(K=2;N=2)N
 0: (19)
From (18) follows that a larger and poorer region { independent of whether or not ag-
glomeration externalities arise { employs too little capital relative to the optimum, even
in the presence of a scal equalization scheme. The sign of the derivative of (18) with
respect to  is ambiguous. Hence, a scal equalization scheme may very well aggravate
spatial ineciency. This would happen with certainty if there were no agglomeration ex-
ternalities. In the presence of agglomeration externalities, additional capital ows in the
larger region. Eventually, the capital intensity in the larger region may be higher than in
the smaller region. Under these circumstances, the scal equalization scheme provides an
incentive to lower the tax rate thereby attracting more capital and increasing eciency.
Numerical simulations show that this is indeed possible if agglomeration externalities are
rather strong. The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 2 Starting at a symmetric tax competition Nash equilibrium of identical re-
gions, migration without movement of capital endowment induces too little parallel capital
ows. If agglomeration externalities are suciently strong, the scal equalization scheme
may increase spatial eciency. Otherwise, scal equalization worsens the outcome of tax
competition.
(19) conrms proposition 1, since migration without a change in the per-capita endow-
ment of capital would maintain spatial eciency if there were no agglomeration externali-
ties. Under the circumstances, the scal equalization scheme has no eect. In contrast, if
externalities occur, the larger region employs too little capital. Since then the derivative of
(19) with respect to  is unambiguously negative, the scal equalization scheme improves
the allocation of capital. Full equalization, i.e.,  = 1, completely restores eciency. The
result is summarized by the following proposition:
7Proposition 3 Starting at a symmetric tax competition Nash equilibrium of identical re-
gions, migration with parallel movement of capital endowment induces too little parallel
capital ows only if agglomeration externalities arise. The scal equalization scheme serves
as a corrective device.
3 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed tax competition when lump-sum taxes are available in a model
which allows for agglomeration externalities. It has shown that asymmetry and not increas-
ing aggregate returns to scale is the main source of ineciency. Furthermore, it has shown
that agglomeration externalities may very well amplify the positive impact of a (partial)
scal equalization scheme. In the presence of agglomeration externalities in regions with
identical per-capita capital endowment, but with dierent population size, a scheme that
equalizes standardized tax revenue across regions increases the eciency of the allocation of
capital. If, in addition, per-capita endowments of capital dier, a scal equalization scheme
has also turned out to be eciency enhancing provided that agglomeration externalities
are suciently strong.
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